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It started with a murder.
Robert John Bardo, a high school dropout from
Tucson, Arizona, was obsessed with actress Rebecca
Schaeffer of the television show, "My Sister Sam."
He wrote fan letters and traveled to California to see
tapings of the show, but he did not get to meet
Schaeffer.' Finally, Bardo hired a private investiga-
tor in Tucson to find Schaeffer's address. The inves-
tigator used California state databases, including one
from the Department of Motor Vehicles, and got
Schaeffer's address." Bardo went to Schaeffer's
neighborhood and, showing her photo, asked people
which apartment was hers.'
Somewhere along the line, Bardo changed from
fan to something else. The Los Angeles Times re-
ported that, "[jiust before his journey to Los Angeles,
he wrote his sister in Knoxville, Tennessee, saying:
'I have an obsession with the unattainable and I
have to eliminate (something) that I cannot at-
tain.' " Bardo finally found his way to Schaeffer's
door. When she answered, he took a .357 magnum
and shot her to death. Bardo was convicted and sen-
tenced to life in prison.5
Following Schaeffer's murder, California passed a
law restricting the dissemination of Department of
Motor Vehicle information." Stories involving as-
saults and murder prompted Virginia to create a
similar law.' In 1994, Senator Barbara Boxer (D-
Calif.), and Representative Jim Moran (D-Va.),
sponsored the Driver's Privacy Protection Act
("Act"), part of the omnibus Violent Crime Control
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and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.' The law is in-
tended to draw a curtain around state motor vehicle
records to preserve the privacy rights and protect the
lives and property of drivers and their families."
The Act, which takes effect September 13, 1997,10
will make disclosure of personal information ob-
tained by any department of motor vehicles illegal."
Information which could identify a person, including
photographs, social security numbers, telephone
numbers, addresses and the driver's name falls
within the ambit the law." There are exceptions for
numerous categories of businesses and academicians
and a provision to allow states to provide for broader
release of information if they choose to set up mech-
anisms to give drivers the right to prevent the release
of their information." The law does not provide for
press or general public access to the information.
This article examines the First Amendment impli-
cations of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act. Al-
though federalism and states' rights concerns provide
strong constitutional arguments against the nature of
the Act, this article remains focused on First Amend-
ment implications. Part I of the article examines the
circumstances leading up to the Act's passage, and
the provisions it contains that are subject to constitu-
tional scrutiny. Part II examines four main constitu-
tional difficulties involved with imposition of the Act,
and specifically analyzes its effect on freedom of the
press. This article concludes that the Driver's Pri-
vacy Protection Act is an unconstitutional infringe-
ment on First Amendment freedoms because it fails
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to provide its intended protection.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Passing the Act
Senator Boxer featured the Schaeffer case promi-
nently in press releases explaining her sponsorship
of the measure. 4 Senator Boxer also referred to
abortion opponents who used license plate informa-
tion to track down and harass doctors and patients of
abortion clinics.1" Meanwhile, Representative Mo-
ran referred to the Schaeffer murder in his testimony
about the Act before the House Subcommittee on
Civil and Constitutional Rights." In addition, he
cited other abuses of motor vehicle records, including
the activities of a group of Iowa teenagers who took
down the license plate number of expensive cars in
order to find the addresses of the vehicles' owners."7
Armed with the information, they went to the homes
and robbed the families.1 Representative Moran tes-
tified, "[in] my own state of Virginia, a woman
found out the names of over thirty licensed drivers
1 See, e.g., Sen. Boxer and Rep. Moran Introduce Bill to
Prohibit DMV From Releasing Personal Information, NEWS
FROM U.S. SENATOR BARBARA BOXER, Oct. 26, 1993. Senator
Boxer explained that
[i]n 32 states, an individual can access someone's name
and address simply by submitting their license plate num-
ber and a nominal fee to the DMV. The availability of
this information has not gone unnoticed by criminals and
others who use it to stalk and initiate unsolicited contact
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'0 In his testimony in opposition to the Act, Richard Oppel,
Washington Bureau Chief for Knight-Ridder Newspapers, re-
counted similar stories involving the use of motor vehicle records.
In 1991, Marilyn Adams of the Miami Herald docu-
mented how the state of Florida had failed in its efforts to
keep drunk drivers off the highways. Using DMV
records, she found nearly 500 drivers in four counties who
each had six or more DUI convictions. Sue Radicki of
Pompano Beach was the wife of a house painter. She was
not as well known as Rebecca Schaeffer. Ms. Radicki was
killed by a convicted drunk driver, driving with a sus-
pended license. It is unfortunate that the Miami Herald's
reporter could not have alerted the community before the
still-driving drunk drove his car into Ms. Radicki's vehi-
by tracing the information through their license plate
numbers, claiming she needed the information be-
cause the drivers in question were stealing the fil-
lings from her teeth."' 9
Various media groups opposed the Boxer-Moran
bill claiming that it provided little protection to the
public, posed a threat to the media's ability to report
on stories affecting public welfare, and would deny
the public valuable information about the efficiency
and functioning of state and federal governments."0
Robert Franklin, staff writer for the Minneapolis
Star-Tribune, wrote about how the news media un-
covered, through the use of Minnesota Department
of Motor Vehicle records, that men convicted of
murder, felony drug possession and armed robbery
were getting jobs as Minnesota school bus drivers.2
B. The Act
Title 18, Chapter 123, of the United States Code
is entitled "Prohibition on Release and Use of Cer-
tain Personal Information from State Motor Vehicle
Records.""2 The Act forbids state employees or con-
cle. We believe that newspapers and organizations like
Mothers Against Drunk Drivers can alert citizens to dan-
gerous drivers when police are overwhelmed but they can
only do this if they have access to records.
Id. (statement of Richard A. Oppel).
21 Robert Franklin, Keeping Open Records Open, MINNE-
APOLIS STAR-TRIB., Feb. 2, 1994, at 12A.
One man's driver's license had been revoked a year ear-
lier. The convictions should have been caught by a com-
puter check, but the state had a backlog of 110,000 crimi-
nal records that had not been entered into its computers.
Star Tribune reporters found that at least 41 pilots of pas-
senger aircraft had lost their Minnesota driver licenses be-
cause of alcohol-related offenses that should have been re-
ported to the Federal Aviation Administration but often
were not.
Channel 4's I-Team found that more than 10,000
wrecked or stolen vehicles were brought into Minnesota
each year, rebuilt - sometimes dangerously - and given
clean titles without inspection. The I-Team helped one
women get back $15,000 she paid for a rebuilt wreck only
to find that it was subsequently sold to another unwary
buyer.
The St. Paul Pioneer Press used the records in its investi-
gation of a man who falsely claimed he had Italian bank-
ing connections that would finance a $35 million horse
and entertainment center on the city's riverfront.
I used motor vehicle records to show that a charity was
pleading for money to buy a refrigerated truck to take
food to the poor a few months after it bought a more ex-
pensive Mercedes-Benz for its president.
Id.
22 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (1994).
[Vol. 4
DMV SECRECY
tractors from disclosing or making available "per-
sonal information about any individual obtained by
the department in connection with a motor vehicle
record."2 The Act backs up this prohibition with
criminal sanctions and a civil cause of action for use
or disclosure of personal information from motor ve-
hicle records.24
However, the Act permits specified uses of per-
sonal information from DMV records." The Act
also enumerates exceptions based on categories of
users as well as categories of uses. The list begins
with state agencies and courts or persons and entities
acting on behalf of government agencies.2 6 It contin-
ues with "legitimate businesses" and their agents,
employees or contractors where the information is
used to verify the accuracy of information submitted
to the business and prevent fraud.2" Other users in-
clude insurers who are investigating claims, 2 investi-
gating fraud, 2 or rating drivers, 0 tow truck opera-
tors who need to notify owners of towed vehicles, 1
and private investigators who are retained in connec-
tion with permissible uses of the information. 2
While it was a private investigation firm which gave
Bardo key information which allowed him to ulti-
mately track down Ms. Schaeffer,8 the Act envisions
investigators providing information only to legitimate
business users or parties in litigation solely for those
purposes endorsed by the Act itself.3 '
Where a user does not fall into any of the catego-
ries, the Act allows the release of the information if
the driver gives written consent for the specific re-
lease." This, and the permitted anti-fraud uses of
driver information, appears to cover situations where
28 Id. § 2721.
24 Id. §§ 2723, 2724.
28 The listing of these uses is broad and allows disclosures
for use in connection with matters of motor vehicle or
driver safety and theft, motor vehicle emissions, motor ve-
hicle product alterations, recalls or advisories, perform-
ance monitoring of motor vehicles and dealers by motor
vehicle manufacturers, and removal of non-owner records
from the original owner records of motor vehicle manufac-
turers to carry out the purposes of the Automobile Infor-
mation Disclosure Act, the Motor Vehicle Information
and Cost Saving Act, the National Traffic and Motor Ve-
hicle Safety Act of 1966, the Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992,
and the Clean Air Act.
Id. § 2725(3).
:6 Id. § 2721(b)(1).
7 Id. § 2721(b)(3)(b).
2U Id. § 2721(b)(6).
29 Id.
I0 d.
81 Id. § 2721(b)(7).
.2 Id. § 2721(b)(8).
consumers pay for purchases with checks and offer a
driver's license as a form of identification. The Act
also provides a mechanism whereby states can per-
mit the release and use of the personal driver infor-
mation by anyone else so long as the states have set
up a mechanism through which persons may choose
not to have their information released. 6 This opt-out
provision also provides for the use of the information
by direct marketers. Direct marketers who obtain the
personal information may resell or make additional
disclosures of the information."
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL
DIFFICULTIES
A. Whether the Act's Imposition of Punishment is
an Unconstitutional Restraint on Speakers Under
the First Amendment
1. The Imposition of Both Civil and Criminal Lia-
bility for Possession or Disclosure of Personal Infor-
mation from Motor Vehicle Records
Section 2722 of the Act imposes both civil and
criminal liability for possession or disclosure of per-
sonal information from motor vehicle records." The
penalties available for disseminating motor vehicle
information under the Act are similar to the prohibi-
tions and punishments at the heart of Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia."' At issue in
Landmark was a Virginia statute, based on a provi-
sion of the state's constitution, that made it a crime
to divulge information about official inquiries re-
" Braun & Jones, supra note 1.
81 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(8) (1994).
3 Id. § 2721(b)(13).
-0 Id. § 2721(b)(12).
37 Id.
3' "It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to obtain
or disclose personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for
any use not permitted under section 2721(b) of this title." Id.
§ 2722. Section 2723(a) provides for fines for violations of the
Act. Subsection (b) allows the Attorney General to impose daily
fines of $5,000 against state departments of motor vehicles for
substantial noncompliance with the Act through policy or prac-
tices. In addition to the fines, section 2724 of the Act creates a
civil cause of action. "A person who knowingly obtains, discloses
or uses personal information from a motor vehicle record for a
purpose not permitted under this chapter shall be liable to the
individual to whom the information pertains, who may bring a
civil action in a United States district court." Id. § 2724. The
Act sets up minimum liquidated damages of $2,500 and punitive
damages are available "upon proof of wilful or reckless
disregard of the law." Id. § 2724(b)(1)-(2).
3- 435 U.S. 829 (1978).'
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garding the conduct of state judges."
The Landmark Court considered the constitution-
ality of convicting and fining a newspaper reporter
for reporting on a pending inquiry by the Virginia
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission ("Com-
mission"). The Commission is vested with the power
to investigate the conduct of judges. Article VI, sec-
tion 10 of the Virginia Constitution provides that
"[p]roceedings before the Commission shall be confi-
dential" and under the state law "[a]ny person who
shall divulge information in violation of the provi-
sions of this section shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor." 1 The Virginia statute's declaration of
criminality, which closely tracks that of the Act,
makes it "unlawful for any person knowingly to ob-
tain or disclose personal information, from a motor
vehicle record, for any use not permitted under sec-
tion 2721(b) of this title."4 The Virginia statute's
confidentiality requirement ends with the filing of a
complaint with the Virginia Supreme Court. "8
The Virginian Pilot newspaper, a part of
Landmark Communications, Inc., published a story
in October 1975 on a pending inquiry by the Com-
mission." A little more than four weeks later, a
grand jury indicted Landmark for violating the state
law." The trial court convicted Landmark and fined
him $500 plus prosecution costs."' The case was af-
firmed by the Virginia Supreme Court." Declaring
that the First Amendment would not permit criminal
sanctions against persons who violated the confiden-
tiality of the Commission proceedings when those
persons were not participants, the United States Su-
preme Court reversed the Virginia court."
The constitutional issue, "whether the First
Amendment permits the criminal punishment of
third persons who are strangers to the inquiry, in-
cluding the news media, for divulging or publishing
truthful information regarding confidential proceed-
40 VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-37.13 (Michie 1971).
41 VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10 (1971).
42 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b)(2) (1994).
:3 VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-37.13 (Michie 1971).
4 Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S.
829, 831 (1978).
45 Id.
41 Id. at 832.
'4 Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 217 Va.
699, 702 (1977), rev'd, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
41 Landmark, 435 U.S. at 837-38.
41 Id. at 837.
00 Id. at 838.
The operation of the Virginia Commission, no less than
the operation' of the judicial system itself, is a matter of
public interest, necessarily engaging the attention of the
news media. The article published by Landmark provided
ings of the Commission," fits precisely the construc-
tion of the Act."' The Court concluded quite firmly
-that the First Amendment bars such an encroach-
ment on the core values of the First Amendment
and, in particular, the "free discussion of government
affairs." 0
The state of Virginia's attorney argued that First
Amendment "protection does not extend to the pub-
lication of information 'which by Constitutional
mandate is to be confidential.' "' In sustaining the
conviction, the Virginia Supreme Court applied a
"clear and present danger test" relying on the legis-
lative declaration "that a clear and present danger to
the orderly administration of justice would be cre-
ated by divulgence of the confidential proceedings of
the Commission." ' The court held that the threat to
the orderly administration of justice was an ample
reason to sustain the constitutionality of the convic-
tion. 8 The state of Virginia's attorney also argued
that the.disclosure of Commission proceedings before
the filing of a complaint would injure the reputations
of judges based on unfounded allegations and
complaints,"
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged
the legitimacy of the state interest in keeping the
Commission's proceedings confidential, but the
Court did not find those reasons sufficient to over-
.come the First Amendment interests at stake.5
"[N]either the Commonwealth's interest in protect-
ing the reputation of its judges, nor its interest in
maintaining the institutional integrity of its courts is
sufficient to justify the subsequent punishment of
speech at issue here, even on the assumption that
criminal sanctions do in fact enhance the guarantee
of confidentiality."" Instead, the Court focused on
the need for public discussion of government institu-
tions and protection of criticism of judges. 57 In addi-
tion, the Court took note of Landmark's punishment,
accurate factual information about a legislatively author-
ized inquiry pending before the Judicial Inquiry and Re-
view Commission, and in so doing clearly served those in-
terests in public scrutiny and discussion of governmental
affairs which the First Amendment was adopted to
protect.
Id. at 839 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
269-70 (1964)).
6 Id. at 840 (quoting Brief for Appellee 17).
02 Id. at 842 (quoting Landmark Communications Inc. v.
Virginia, 217 Va. 699, 708 (1977)).
be Id.
54 Id. at 845.
65 Id.
6 Id. at 841.




even though it was not a participant in the judicial
review process. 8 The Court also took time to closely
analyze the Virginia Supreme Court's use of the
"clear and present danger" test to justify the convic-
tion and penalty in Landmark. Referring to a series
of cases including Bridges v. California,9 Craig v.
Harney," and Wood v. Georgia,"' the Court con-
cluded that "[w]hat emerges from these cases is the
'working principle that the substantive evil must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high before utterances can be punished
2. The Link Between Stalking and Motor Vehicle
Records
While stalking is a substantive evil, the link be-
tween motor vehicle records and the isolated actions
of unbalanced individuals has not been firmly estab-
lished, at least to the degree required under the
"clear and present danger" test. While the House
record on the Boxer-Moran legislation contains emo-
tional and compelling testimony about. stalking, it is
mostly anecdotal. 63 The witnesses relate incidents to
demonstrate the seriousness of the stalking problem
and endorse the idea of making motor vehicle records
secret as one means to fight back. Moreover, the rec-
ord leaves unresolved the question of how frequently
stalkers and other criminals have used motor vehicle
information to locate their victims. Kristin King, a
legislative assistant to Representative Moran, recal-
led only twenty incidents where a stalker found his
victim through motor vehicle records." In the ab-
sence of a legislative finding of a direct and immedi-
ate linkage between the release of motor vehicle in-
formation and specific violent crime, the Act falls
short of the minimum required under the "clear and
present danger" test.
In addition, the Act does not preclude the possibil-
ity that stalkers might be employed in any of the
businesses that are granted access to motor vehicle
information under the Act. There are no federal or
Id. at 836-37.
314 U.S. 252 (1941).
331 U.S. 367 (1947).
370 U.S. 375 (1962).
62 Landmark, 435 U.S. at 845 (citing Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941)).
62 See discussion supra part I.A.
Franklin, supra note 21.
s In September 1994, California Governor Pete Wilson
signed into law a bill aimed at ensuring the privacy of informa-
tion in voter registration records. The law restricts access to ad-
dresses and telephone numbers to defined categories including
state measures to prevent stalkers from holding jobs
with insurance companies, automobile manufacturers
or tow truck businesses. Finally, as businesses have
the right under the Act to obtain driver information
in the normal course of dealing with customers,
stalkers employed in the retail and service fields will
continue to have access to the information when con-
sumers and potential victims pay by check and offer
their driver's licenses as identification.
Efforts at the state level, particularly in Califor-
nia, to restrict access to other government informa-
.tion, such as voter registration records, point to the
existence of alternate means to obtain personal infor-
mation about persons from government records."
The exclusion of a single category of records will not
achieve the government interest that is central to the
Act. .
3. Driver Information and Public Speech About
Government
Opponents of the Act point to instances where the
access to motor vehicle records has provided signifi-
cant information about the process and efficiency of
government. The news media have brought to the
public's attention -failures on the part of state agen-
cies to keep drivers who have been convicted of alco-
hol-related offenses off the roads. For example, the
Greensboro News & Record (North Carolina) re-
ported in October 1994 that newspapers in Georgia
and Ohio used motor vehicle databases to identify
persons who had been convicted a dozen or more
times of driving under the influence of alcohol." Ac-
cess to motor vehicle records is an essential part of
the public's ability to Scrutinize the operation of gov-
ernment, a key part of the Landmark decision. As
the Court there maintained:
[t]he article published by Landmark provided accurate
factual information about a legislatively authorized in-
quiry pending before the Judicial Inquiry Commission,
and in so doing dearly served those interests in public
scrutiny and discussion of governmental affairs which the
the news media, scholars and politicians. See CAL. ELECTIONS
CODE §§ 18110, 29208 (Deering 1995); CAL. ELECTIONS CODE
§ 6254.4 (Deering 1995).
Lex Alexander, Computers Make Officials Worry About
Privacy, GREENSBORO NEWS & REc., Oct. 8, 1994, at D5. The
Minneapolis Star-Tribune's discovery that the FAA was igno-
rant of the fact that 41 commercial pilots had lost their driver's
licenses goes to the heart of public discussion about the conduct
of government operatiois. The problem extends from the state
level, he hens vecittiis occurred, to the federal gov.
erfinent. See 'Ffanklin, supraqnote.21.
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First Amendment was adopted to protect.
The Franklin article suggests that the Act might
prevent people from trying to identify drug dealers
operating in their neighborhoods, persons who wit-
ness hit-and-run accidents and others who see dan-
gerous driving which endangers children." The
Greensboro News & Record quoted North Carolina
officials with Mothers Against Drunk Driving who
expressed concerns about the group's ability to iden-
tify chronic drunk drivers or to provide courts with
supplemental information about the drunk driving
histories of defendants. "
The Act specifically excludes personal information
on a driver's accidents, violations, and whether that
driver has a current or valid license.70 Despite this
limited access, the Act does not provide for the level
of public accountability achieved by current access to
motor vehicle records.71 Thus, closed off is an impor-
tant First Amendment function, and the public is de-
nied needed information about the efficient operation
of government.
The Act would also have the effect of disparate
protection for some persons whose personal informa-
tion falls under the Act's exclusions. A would-be
stalker could claim a minor accident on private prop-
erty and use a license plate to get personal informa-
tion about a potential victim.72 A stalker might find
a driver who was involved in an accident or who had
a moving violation. Under the Act, a department of
motor vehicles might decide to release a driver's in-
formation under the exemption for information re-
garding "motor vehicle or driver safety."17 8 In such a
case, a driver would lose the Act's protection for hav-
ing been caught driving under the influence or being
involved in an accident, notwithstanding fault.
It is difficult to overstate the significance of motor
vehicle information. The United States contains a
mobile society that relies significantly on the automo-
bile.74 American youth view getting a driver's license
as the rite of passage into adulthood .7 Driving privi-
67 Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S.
829, 839 (1978).
" Franklin, supra note 21.
69 Alexander, supra note 66.
70 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b) (1994).
"1 See Franklin, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
7, However, the law is unclear in this respect. It will be up
to the courts to determine whether this is permissible.
73 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b).
74 See, e.g., Marty Racine, Lifestyle Happy Wanderers:
Carrying Their Homes with Them Like Turtles, Full-Time
RVers Love Their Life on the Road, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar.
31, 1996, at 1; Mark Savage, SS '96 Auto Show, MILWAUKEE J.
leges take primacy over the right to vote, illustrated
by the fact that there are 190 million persons of vot-
ing-age in America and only about 120 million actu-
ally registered.76 There are, by comparison, about
168 million licensed drivers in the United States.
77
The primacy of driving rights over voter rights
helped fuel passage of the National Voter Registra-
tion Act of 1993, also known as the "Motor Voter
Law." 7 The law was designed to facilitate voter re-
gistration by allowing persons to register to vote
when they renewed their drivers licenses.
79
Without access to such information, society loses
the opportunity to gauge for itself the effectiveness of
government in its attempt to keep dangerous drivers
off the road. In addition, it does not provide society
with the opportunity to see just how fair the justice
system is in its treatment of wealthy versus poor or
majority versus minority. Also, information from
motor vehicle and driver records provides a snapshot
of American society which is unavailable from any
other single source. Finally, the use of driver infor-
mation provides a widely available and reliable
means of identification of individuals. Locking this
information away from the public in return for a
false feeling of security is a tradeoff that runs
counter to good public policy and First Amendment
principles.
B. The Right to Receive Information
The laundry list of public interest stories gener-
ated by motor vehicle records raises a second, but
equally significant First Amendment issue based on
the right of the public to access information. In
1976, the United States Supreme Court recognized
the coexisting right to receive information with the
right to disseminate information in Virginia Phar-
macy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council.80 The
Court examined a Virginia statute that made the ad-
vertising of prescription drug prices unprofessional
conduct.8" A consumer group challenged the statute,
& SENTINEL, Feb. 23, 1996, at 1.
15 See, e.g., Anita & Paul Lienert, Transportation Shifting
Gears, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 17, 1996, at 1.
76 Registrations to Vote Are at Record Pace, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Sept. 5, 1995, at AT.
77 Man on Moon Needs Wheels, SALT LAKE TRI., Oct. 2,
1993, at A6.
71 National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-31, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-3 (1994).
70 Id.
80 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
81 Id. at 750.
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which was previously attacked unsuccessfully by
pharmacists themselves. 2 In affirming a federal dis-
trict court ruling that the statute was void, the Court
raised the question of the rights of the Virginia Con-
sumer Council as consumers of drug pricing infor-
mation.8" The Court noted that "[fireedom of speech
presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker
exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is
to the communication, to its source and to its recipi-
ents both."'"
In addition, the Court noted that its prior cases,
including Lamont v. Postmaster General,85 and
Procunier v. Martinez,8 recognized the rights of
audiences.8" Also, referring to Kleindienst v.
Mandel,"" the Court stated, "[w]e acknowledged that
this Court has referred to a First Amendment right
to 'receive information and ideas,' and that freedom
of speech 'necessarily protects the -right to re-
ceive.' "89 But the Court has not gone so far as to
enunciate a right to gather information and has spe-
cifically refused to endorse such a proposition, with
the exception of criminal trials,90 in a series of cases
dealing with rights of travel and rights of access. 91
Balancing a purported important governmental in-
terest against a First Amendment value, the Act fails
to carry its burden of providing that interest." In
addition, the penalties for non-participants and the
recipients of motor vehicle information implicates the
First Amendment right to receive information.
The Act eliminates the public's right to receive in-
formation about the nature of government in the im-
portant area of driver regulation. For example, a
news story about a state's failure to regulate drivers
who have been convicted of driving while intoxicated
or one discussing the ability of the public to match
up lists of convicted felons with the names of school
bus drivers provides the voting public with informa-
tion on which to base decisions about the efficacy
and desirability of government policies. Such infor-
mation might well be found to enjoy the same level
of importance as the public's right to know the price
of, say, Acromycin tablets (an antibiotic) at different
I' d. at 753.
83 Id.
" Id. at 756.
86 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
Be 416 U.S. 396 (overruled by Thornburgh v. Abott, 490
U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989)).
87 Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756.
88 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
89 Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 757 (quoting
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972)).
" See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California
for County of Riverside, 478 U.S. 1, 15 (1986).
pharmacies in Virginia. In this respect, the result of
implementation of the Act appears to be a world
where reliance must be placed on the assumption
that state agencies are self-regulating, and that, as a
result, they are operating efficiently and appropri-
ately in carrying out their functions. As Chief Jus-
tice Warren Burger wrote in Richmond Newspapers
v. Virginia,9" a case relating to access at criminal tri-
als, "[p]eople in an open society do not demand in-
fallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for
them to accept what they are prohibited from
observing.""'
The Act includes a provision that may grant non-
enumerated individuals or entities the right to obtain
and disclose motor vehicle information, but only in
the context of law enforcement or other state action.
Section 2721(b)(1) allows access to motor vehicle
records "[f]or use by any government agency, includ-
ing any court or law enforcement agency, in carrying
out its functions, or any private person or entity act-
ing on behalf of a Federal, State, or local agency in
carrying out its functions."9 The question which
arises from this language is the degree to which pri-
vate persons or entities must have the sanction of
government agencies or the courts to examine driving
records. If there is no threshold, one could imagine a
Robert Bardo seeking motor vehicle information
about a Rebecca Schaeffer for the ostensible purpose
of reporting her driving to a government agency.
Even more significant is the role of the press in
such a statutory scheme. The right of media to ob-
tain access to motor vehicle records under the Act
would be limited to their participation in law en-
forcement and prosecutorial efforts "acting on behalf
of a Federal, State, or local agency in carrying out
its functions." 96 The media indicated its disdain for
the role government agents or informants play in
Branzburg v. Hayes,97 decided together with In re
Pappas9" and United States v. Caldwell." The three
cases involved demands on three reporters by one
federal grand jury and two state grand juries to dis-
close confidential information they obtained from
*' See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965); Regan v.
Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984).
" See Zemel, 381 U.S. at 1; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974);
Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
98 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
9" Id. at 572-73.
95 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
-6 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1) (1994).





sources about alleged criminal activity.' 00 Although
the United States Supreme Court rejected an out-
right privilege for reporters in Branzburg, subse-
quent decisions in Federal Appeals Courts allowed
for considerable protection for the media. 1'0
In addition, requiring that persons or entities re-
ceiving and disclosing motor vehicle information to
do so on behalf of government agencies undermines
the traditional role of the press in monitoring the
functions of government and government officials.' 02
More broadly, the denial of such information and
the types of stories that have been generated from
such information poses a generalized threat to First
Amendment principles. As the Supreme Court said
in New York Times v. Sullivan,06
[t]he general proposition that freedom of expression upon
public questions is secured by the First Amendment has
long been settled by our decisions. The constitutional safe-
guard, we have said, "was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people. The maintenance of
the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government will be responsive to the will of the people
and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an
opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a
fundamental principal of our constitutional system."'"
C. Disparate Treatment of Political and Commer-
cial Speech
The Act grants to certain categories of businesses
immediate access to motor vehicle records.' 0 ' The list
covers motor vehicle market research, business
surveys, towing service operators, businesses seeking
to verify the accuracy of information provided by
customers and private investigators who use the in-
formation for permitted purposes."' While the Act
provides that the information given to commercial
users is to be used only for those enumqrated pur-
100 Id. at 665-79. In these cases, the reporters fought grand
jury attempts to obtain confidential information they gathered in
preparation to write stories: Branzburg dealt with information
about the manufacture of hashish; and both Pappas and Cald-
well dealt with information about activities of the Black
Panthers. Id.
101 See, e.g., Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir.
1993) ("Shoen I"); Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412, 414 (9th Cir.
1995) ("Shoen II").
10. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 1957); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
105 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b) (1994).
106 Id.
poses, it is clear that there are no practical safe-
guards available to ensure the information will only
be used for those purposes.
The general public, including the media, may
have access to the same information, but only if state
'legislatures pass laws creating opt-out provisions."'
Opt-out provisions would provide persons an oppor-
tunity to request that the state not release their
driver information.' 0" The requirement that the pub-
lic obtain legislative permission puts the commercial
user in a preferred position over speakers and audi-
ences interested in issues falling under the umbrella
of political speech.
It is for these two reasons the Act faces a chal-
lenge under principles enunciated in Smith v. Daily
Mail.'0" In Smith, the Daily Mail Publishing Corp.,
operating the Charleston Daily Gazette (West Vir-
ginia), published the name of a fourteen-year-old
suspected in the murder of another teen." 0 The state
of West Virginia indicted the newspaper for publish-
ing the name of the juvenile suspect in violation of
Section 49-7-3 of the West Virginia Code that read
in part, "nor shall the name of any child, in connec-
tion with any proceedings under this chapter be pub-
lished in any newspaper without a written order of
the court.""' The statute made such publication a
misdemeanor." 2
The publishing company sought a writ of prohibi-
tion arguing that the statute was unconstitutional as
a prior restraint and an abridgement of the freedom
of the press."' The West Virginia Supreme Court
granted the writ of prohibition and the United States
Supreme Court upheld the West Virginia Court's
decision."' The United States Supreme Court did
not reach the issue of whether the statute constituted
a prior restraint. 1" Still, the Court noted the diffi-
culty facing any regulation that operates as a prior
restraint.1'
Guided by First Amendment principles, the Court
1'0 Judith Beth Prowda, Privacy and Security of Data, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 738, 754 (1995).
108 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal
Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States,
80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 612 (1995).
109 443 U.S. 97, 99 (1979).
110 Id. at 99.
... W.VA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-3 (Michie 1976).
I's Id.
Is Smith, 443 U.S. at 100.
114 Id.
118 Id. at 102 (quoting Landmark Communications v. Vir-
ginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978)).
I's Id. 101-02.
Whether we view the statute as a prior restraint or as a
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determined that West Virginia sought to protect the
anonymity of juvenile offenders. 117 Yet, while the
statute forbade the public identification of juvenile
offenders by newspapers, 8 it remained silent about
publication by any other means. "In this very case,
three radio stations announced the alleged assailant's
name before the Daily Mail decided to publish it.
Thus, even assuming the statute served a state-inter-
est of the highest order, it does not accomplish its
stated purpose. ' ' H 9
The free dissemination of motor vehicle informa-
tion to enumerated categories of entities, such as pri-
vate investigators, creates similar risk that is associ-
ated with the free flow of that information in many
states. " In addition, the Act permits the entities in
the enumerated categories to resell the information
for their permitted purposes. 21 Under the strict
scrutiny standard required of government regulation
of speech, the Act fails to achieve the clear purpose
of the statute.
The United States Supreme Court in Smith de-
clined to address the issue of the denial of equal pro-
tection with respect to the treatment of newspapers
and other segments of the mass media. 22 Neverthe-
less, it remains a significant issue when considered in
light of the unequal treatment between commercial
users and all others, including the media. 123
While the courts recognize that commercial speech
enjoys protection under the First Amendment, that
level of protection has been less than that accorded
political speech. 24 In extending First Amendment
protection to prescription drug advertising in Vir-
ginia Pharmacy, the court mentioned in a footnote
the significant differences between pure commercial
speech, which merely proposes transactions, and po-
litical speech.12 Even recognizing speech protection
penal sanction for publishing lawfully obtained, truthful
information is not dispositive- because even the latter ac-
tion requires the highest form of state interest to sustain
its validity. Prior restraints have been accorded the most
exacting scrutiny in previous cases.
Id.
117 Id. at 104.
21 W.VA. CODE'ANN. § 49-7-3 (Michie 1976).
119 Smith, 443 U.S. at 105.
120 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b)(1-14) (1994).
121 Id. § 2721(c).
122 Smith, 443 U.S. at 106 n.4.
"' Id. at 104-05; see also W.VA. CODE ANN. § 49-7-3
(1995).
124 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
129 "Even if the differences do not justify the conclusion that
commercial speech is valueless, and thus subject to complete sup-
pression by the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different
for commercial speech, those protection exist at levels
that may permissively fall below those for political
speech. Therefore, the grant of preference to com-
mercial users of motor vehicle information for com-
mercial purposes, including motor vehicle satisfaction
surveys or insurance underwriting, falls well below
the important First Amendment issues raised with
respect to government conduct that is reported on by
the media for the purpose of generating public
discussion.
D. Overbreadth in Government Regulation of
Speech
The restriction of the right of the public and me-
dia to have access to and to disclose driver informa-
tion also raises the issue of whether the Act would
pass muster under the test laid out by the Supreme
Court in United States v. O'Brien.26 That case in-
volved David Paul O'Brien's appeal of his conviction
for burning his Selective Service draft card. 2 7
O'Brien argued that the statute making it a crime to
destroy or mutilate a draft card was an unconstitu-
tional abridgement of his rights to symbolic speech
protected by the First Amendment. 2 While the
Court upheld his conviction in the face of O'Brien's
argument, it also laid out a multi-part test for deter-
mining whether statutes infringe on free speech. 9
The Court noted that the nature of the govern-
ment interest was high, in fact, "compelling," "sub-
stantial," "paramount" and "subordinating." 13 0 The
Court referred to several cases involving government
regulation of speech 81 such as NAACP v. Button"'
where it pointed out that "[t]he decisions of this
Court have consistently held that only a compelling
state interest in the regulation of a subject within the
degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truth-
ful and legitimate information is unimpaired." Id. at 771-72
n.24.
126 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
127 Id.
18 Id. at 370.
129 [W]e think it clear that a government regulation is
sufficiently justified if it. is within the constitutional power
of the Government; if it furthers an important or substan-
tial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment free-
doms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.
Id. at 377.-
190 Id. at 376-77.
1I1 Id. at 376-77 nn.22-27.
19 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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State's constitutional power to regulate can justify
limiting First Amendment freedoms."1 83 In Button,
the Court found a statute barring the encouragement
of lawsuits and the recommendation of particular at-
torneys to fall short of a compelling nature.1 "
"[T]he State has failed to advance any substantial
regulatory interest, in the form of substantive evils
flowing from petitioner's activities, which can justify
the broad prohibitions which it has imposed."1 '
E. A Substantial Governmental Interest
The Act fails to meet both substantial governmen-
tal interest and the narrowly tailored requirements.
The record fails to show a substantial number of in-
stances in which there is a direct, causal relationship
between the release of motor vehicle records and a
paramount interest on the part of the federal govern-
ment. Although anecdotal information points to the
occasional use of motor vehicle records by stalkers,
there is no clear-cut pattern. Even if such a pattern
might be discerned, the availability of other sources
of personal information still available from state and
local governments makes the restrictions on this one
class of records a mere hindrance to a determined
pursuer.
In addition, the protective scheme has many holes.
The breadth of the list of enumerated users of the
driver information, and the absence of controls over
their conduct, makes the restriction on the access and
use of the information ineffective. Private investiga-
tion firms have access to motor vehicle information
under the Act. Bardo obtained information about his
victim, Schaeffer, from a private investigation firm,
and the story of his deception demonstrates the un-
workability of the Act. In the Schaeffer murder, the
Los Angeles Times reported Bardo went to the A.A.
Investigators detective agency in Tucson on June 1,
1988. " " He carried with him several letters from
Schaeffer and a publicity photo. The Times quoted
an unnamed detective agency official who said that
Bardo indicated that "he needed to get in touch with
an old friend."
1 3 7
Because Bardo had Tucson roots (a permanent
address, employment, lived with his parents) the
agency agreed to look for Schaeffer. Considering the
lengths to which Bardo was willing to go to find
188 Id. at 438.
184 Id.
135 Id. at 444.
i86 Braun & Jones, supra note 1, at Al.
187 Id.
18 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
Schaeffer, it is all too conceivable that stalkers will
pass themselves off as agents or owners of legitimate
businesses to get the information from state depart-
ments of motor vehicles. Failing that, they, like
Bardo, might employ private investigators to get the
information they need. The minor violation of the
law they would commit to obtain the information is
insignificant compared with the violations they com-
mit as they stalk, confront, assault and kill their vic-
tims. In addition, the grant of access to tow truck
operators, insurance companies, car manufacturers
and researchers, presupposes that no stalker will
ever be so employed or be able to get access to the
motor vehicle information through fraud or trickery.
In light of the Act's inability to further its own
stated purpose, the statute fails the first part of the
O'Brien test. While the Act may not have as its ulti-
mate goal the suppression of free expression, the Act
restricts First Amendment freedoms to a degree
greater than that allowed under O'Brien because the
furtherance of the interest is not met by the Act
itself.
III. CONCLUSION
While the right of the people to be secure in their
own homes is important, a generalized fear cannot
justify the imposition of restrictions on information
held by government or restrictions on speakers. Su-
preme Court Justice Louis Brandeis wrote compel-
lingly, in Whitney v. People of the State of Califor-
nia," ' of the dangers created when people give in to
unreasoned fear. " " For example, Anita Whitney
was prosecuted and convicted for her participation in
the activities of the Communist Party in Califor-
nia." The fear of the Communist ideology and phi-
losophy was such that the state sought to bury it
under criminal statutes. While Communism posed a
degree of risk, the harm to the First Amendment was
immeasurably greater.
The Act was created to help victims of the crime
of stalking by denying criminals a means of identify-
ing and locating victims. For those whose well being
and lives are at stake, the interest is compelling. But
the number of persons involved is small. The interest
to be protected does not outweigh the interests pro-
tected by the First Amendment. In addition, the Act
18" Id. at 376. Brandeis wrote: "[f]ear of serious injury can-
not alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men
feared witches and burnt women .... To justify suppression of
free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious




provides scant protection permitting access by nu-
merous categories of commercial users who are free
to use or misuse the motor vehicle information, sub-
ject only to relatively minor sanctions.
On the other hand, the denial of access to motor
vehicle records forecloses significant discussion of the
operations of government. The failure of government
to keep drivers with records of drunk driving arrests
off the road is a matter of public concern in light of
the numbers of highway deaths attributed to drink-
ing and driving. In addition, the use of motor vehicle
records to identify persons and institutions and to
track their activities has value to the public, espe-
cially when conduct varies significantly from public
positions. For example, prosecutors and judges who
grant preferential treatment to friends, families and
colleagues are properly of concern to voters who pass
judgment on them. Also, a news article about a char-
ity spending thousands of dollars on a luxury car for
its president at the same time it sought money for
charitable activities, gives the public important
information.
The right of the people, including the media, to
talk about the operation of government and the pub-
lic to hear about those operations, outweighs the
well-intentioned, though unconstitutional, effort to
provide a sense of security for those at risk from
stalkers. At an even more basic level, the Act pro-
vides an illusory protection because there are no
guarantees that stalkers will not have access to the
information, either as employees or through fraud.
The criminal sanctions imposed provide little deter-
rent for stalkers whose fixations lead them to commit
violent acts against their victims. There are any
number of other sources of information available.
But even if the government could identify all the
sources, it would still be a violation of the rights pro-
tected by the First Amendment for both speakers and
the audience to lock that information away. The
supporters of the Act fear stalkers and appear will-
ing to burn the First Amendment in order to quash
that fear.
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